

REMARKS

Reconsideration of the application in light of the above amendments and the following remarks is respectfully requested.

Status of the Claims

Claims 5-15 are pending. Claims 1-2 were previously canceled. Claims 3-4 have been withdrawn from consideration.

Claims 5 and 6 have been amended. Support for the amendments to claims 5 and 6 can be found in the Specification on page 1, paragraph 0003, page 4, paragraph 0014, and page 6, paragraph 0024-0026.

Claims 7-15 have been added. Claims 7-15 are directed to the elected Group II. Support for added claims 7-15 can be found in the Specification on page 5, paragraph 0017 through page 7, paragraph 0026.

No new matter has been added.

Objection to the Specification

The Examiner has objected to the Specification for containing minor informalities. Applicants have amended the Specification to fix minor typographical inaccuracies. Reconsideration and withdrawal of the objection is respectfully requested.

Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. §101

Claims 5 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the Examiner contends that the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Specifically, the Examiner contends that claims 5 and 6 are directed to methods for establishing a key, the result of which is the

{W:\20811\0204473us0\00907111.DOC ~~~~~ }

Thus, when each subscriber T_j , $j \neq 1$, receives the message M_{1j} which contains the encrypted random number z_1 , the respective subscriber T_j , $j \neq 1$, is able to decrypt the encrypted random number z_1 because $k^{1j} = k^{j1}$, i.e., $(g^{z_1})^{z_j} = (g^{z_j})^{z_1}$. See, Specification, page 5, paragraph 0018. Each subscriber T_j is then able to calculate a common key $k := h(z_1, g^{z_2} \dots g^{z_n})$ because $h(x_1, x_2 \dots x_n)$ has the property that it is symmetrical in its arguments. See, Specification, paragraph 0026. Therefore, by having the encrypted random number z_1 in message M_{1j} , each subscriber T_j is able to decrypt the value of z_1 using the properties of the symmetrical encryption algorithm, as explained above.

The Specification gives the example where there are three subscribers in the group, and $h(z_1, g^{z_2} \dots g^{z_n}) = g^{z_1 \cdot z_1} \cdot g^{z_2 \cdot z_1} \dots g^{z_n \cdot z_1}$. See, Specification, paragraph 0026. In this example, after the generating step recited in claim 5, the first subscriber T_1 will have received $N_2 = g^{z_2} \bmod p$ and $N_3 = g^{z_3} \bmod p$. The first subscriber T_1 then encrypts N_2 and N_3 to create k^{12} and k^{13} , and transmits the random number z_1 encrypted in the form of M_{12} and M_{13} using transmission keys k^{12} and k^{13} to subscribers T_2 and T_3 . T_2 and T_3 each decrypt the random number z_1 using the property that $k^{ji} = (g^{z_i})^{z_j} = (g^{z_j})^{z_i}$ (i.e., T_2 knows that $(g^{z_2})^{z_1} = (g^{z_1})^{z_2}$, and thus, T_2 can determine the random number z_1 ; likewise with T_3 .)

At this point, T_2 knows z_1 , z_2 , and has $(g^{z_3})^{z_1}$ from M_{13} . Likewise, T_3 knows z_1 , z_3 and has $(g^{z_2})^{z_1}$ from M_{12} . T_1 also knows z_1 , and has $(g^{z_2})^{z_1}$ and $(g^{z_3})^{z_1}$ because T_1 received $N_2 = g^{z_2} \bmod p$ and $N_3 = g^{z_3} \bmod p$. Thus, each of the subscribers T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 have all of the necessary information to calculate the common key k , because each subscriber T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 has sufficient information to substitute the values of $g^{z_1 \cdot z_1}$, $g^{z_2 \cdot z_1}$ and $g^{z_3 \cdot z_1}$ to determine the common key k . Each of the subscribers T_1 , T_2 , T_3 can determine the value of $g^{z_1 \cdot z_1}$, and T_2 and T_3 can calculate $g^{z_2 \cdot z_1}$ and

$g^{z^2 z^1}$, respectively. Although T_2 does not actually know the value of z^3 , T_2 has the value of $(g^{z^3})^{z^1}$, and therefore can calculate k . Likewise, although T_3 does not actually know the value of z^2 , T_3 has the value of $(g^{z^2})^{z^1}$, and therefore can calculate k .

Thus, it is clear that each of the subscribers $T_j, j \neq 1$ does not need to have direct access to the random number z^1 , and by having only the encrypted version of z^1 , each of the subscribers T_j is able to calculate the common key k . Applicants submit that claim 5 recites the necessary steps for carrying out the claimed invention, and therefore, is not indefinite.

With respect to the Examiner's rejection regarding the variable " k^{j1n} " recited in claim 6, Applicants respectfully note that claim 6 does not appear to recite such a variable. Applicants submit that claim 6 recites the variable " $k^j = k^{j1}$ " which has been defined in base claim 5. With respect to the Examiner's rejection regarding the feature of "the key" recited in claim 6, Applicants have amended claim 6 to have proper antecedent basis.

In view of the above remarks, Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration and withdrawal of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph.

New Claims

New claims 7-15 are directed to subject matter similar to that recited in claims 5 and 6. Support for added claims 7-15 can be found in the Specification on page 5, paragraph 0017 through page 7, paragraph 0026. It is respectfully submitted that new claims 7-15 are patentable.

